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The cold war has become, in large measure, a 
technological race for military advantage. 
David Z. Beckler, Executive secretarYi Science Advisory Committee, 1955 
To scientists concerned with national security after World War 
II, the miracles achieved by the wartime Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD) -- and especially by the dramatic results of its 
spinoff Manhattan Project -- demanded a permanent transformation of the 
relationship between civilian science and the American state. National 
security was understood to depend, henceforth, upon technological 
superiority. The atomic bomb had brought the war in the Pacific to a 
sudden end without risking the expenditure of ground troops in an 
invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Now nuclear weapons and other 
technological means were touted to offset the Soviet manpower advantage 
in postwar Europe. Technological superiority required, in turn, state-
supported programs and facilities of scientific research. And, of 
course, staffing the programs and facilities called for overcoming the 
acute wartime shortages of expert personnel by steadily enlarging the 
nation's pool of trained scientists and engineers. 
The research had to address two broad types of subjects: 
those clearly related to military technology (for example, the behavior 
1 Beckler, "Notes on Science Organization and National Policy," 
Karl T. Campton/James R. Killian MSS, MIT Archives, Box 257, folder 21. 
(Hereafter, C/K MSS). For support during the period of research on this 
paper, I am grateful for a fellowship year at the Center for Advanced 
Study of the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, and for a grant 
from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. 
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of electromagnetic radiation at the frequencies of microwave radar); 
second, those falling under the rubric of pure science, often defined 
by a logic internal to the field and commonly exemplified, in the 
discussions of the late 1940s, by the nuclear explorations that had 
made possible the invention of the atomic bomb. The first would 
contribute directly to the development of military technology; either 
could yield radically new weapons in the future. Same of it could be 
conducted in government laboratories. But among the key lessons of OSRD 
was that a significant part of it had to exploit the civilian 
scientific sector outside government, the laboratories of both industry 
and -- for the most innovative work -- of academia. Here -- at least in 
the view of the civilian scientific veterans of OSRD -- was where fresh 
thinking and activi~ on the frontiers of science were the norm. Here 
was where the ideas for radical new weapons and weapons systems would 
most likely originate -- especially if its knowledgeable civilian 
scientists were kept involved in the forging of national strategic 
policy. As Vannevar Bush, the head of OSRD, had argued as early as 
1941, only by drawing upon scientific experts familiar with the latest 
laboratory products could military planners know the best way to 
exploit new weapons. Only by having access to the military's strategic 
requirements could defense scientists best understand the kinds of 
weapons that needed developing. 2 
By 1949/50, the eve of the Korean War, a series of policy 
initiatives and political compromises had transformed relationships 
2 Kevles, The Physicists (1987), p. 308. 
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between science and the American state to a considerable extent. In 
fiscal 1950, the federal government spent some $1 billion for R&D, 
which was almost $300 million more than it had spent for the purpose in 
1946, the year of demobilization. Most of it -- 90% -- came from the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD). The 
DOD R&D budget totaled somewhat more than $500 million, which supported 
at least 15,000 different projects. Some 54% of the department's R&D 
obligations were for work in industry; about 9% for research in 
universities and other non-profits. The Defense Department's role in 
American science was an intensified version in 1950 of what it had 
already started to became in the immediate postwar period, when the 
director of the Research and Development Division of the Army General 
Staff had declared that "the publically owned laboratories and drafting 
rooms, as well as the research and engineering staffs of our 
educational institutions, industries and foundations, are being put to 
work in as orderly a manner as possible by the research and engineering 
agencies of the War and Navy Departments. "3 
However, about 36% of DOD research dollars went to government 
laboratories, including such civilian facilities as the National Bureau 
of Standards, but mainly to the installations of the armed services 
themselves, and many civilian scientists found defense research in the 
service laboratories decidedly unattractive. While pay scales were said 
3 Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as a 
Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-1960," HSPS 
(1987), p. 180; James Forrestal to Karl T Compton, Sept. 30, l~ 
Chart, "Research and Development Obligations of the Department of 
Defense," Fig.2, attached to "Science Advisory Comnittee, Sumnary, Mtg. 
No.3," Sept. 18, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 245, Folder 16; Box 256, folder 10. 
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to be competitive for junior, less distinguished personnel, at the 
senior level they were thought to be noncompetitive with those in 
industry and academia. 4 Then, too, at a number of service 
laboratories, civilian scientists had to work under the control of 
military officers and to submit to their judgment in technical matters. 
Among the worst offenders in the management of civilian scientists was 
the Air Force's principal R&D facility at Wright Field, in Dayton, 
Ohio, where slights against civilians included prohibiting them fram 
using the Officers' Club. The Air Force, having long relied for 
technical advances on industrial contractors and the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics, had no tradition of civilian-scientific 
management; it was in the process of building up its R&D capacities 
virtually from scratch. Still, the military's traditional jealousy of 
its prerogatives pervaded the other two service branches. Not only at 
Wright Field but in several Army and Navy laboratories, it was 
difficult to get and hold first-class civilian scientists. 5 
4 Chart, "Research and Development Obligations of the Department 
of Defense," Fig.2, attached to "Science Advisory Corrmittee, Surrmary, 
Mtg. No.3," Sept. 18, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 245, Folder 16; Box 256, 
folder 10; William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with Robert 
F. Bacher ••• ," Nov. 6, 1950, p.2, William T. Golden MSS 
5 William T. Golden, Memos to File, "Conversation with Brigadier 
General L.E. Simon and Major General A.C. McAuliffe, March 1, 1951 as 
of Feb. 28, 1951, p. 1; 'tonversation with Lt. General Hull and Dr. 
Robertston, Director and Deputy Director of the Weapons System 
Evaluation Group," Nov. 21, 1950 as of Nov. 15, 1950, p. 1; ''Meeting 
with Roger W. Jones, Assistant Director in Charge of Legislative 
Reference, Bureau of the Budget," Oct. 11, 1950, p. 1; "Conversation 
with Dr. Ellis Johnson and George Short1ey, Director and Deputy 
Director, Operational Research Organization, u.S. Army (Johns Hopkins 
Contract) Nov. 21, 1950; "Conversation with Mr. William A. M. Burden," 
Feb. 27, 1951 as of Feb. 18, 1951, pp. 1-2; Golden MSS. John Manley, 
assistant to the director at Los Alamos, thought that the military had 
5 
Each of the armed services had gotten around the pay-scale 
constraint -- and compromised on the control issue -- by extending into 
peacetime arrangements that had originated during the war under which 
leading universities managed major weapons research facilities for 
defense agencies. Perhaps the best known was the Los Alamos Weapons 
Laboratory, which the University of California operated, first for the 
Manattan Project, then for its successor, the Atomic Energy commission. 
(In 1949, J. Robert Oppenheimer remarked with irony that "it is a great 
liberal university that is the only place in the world, as far as I 
know, that manufactures, under contract with the United States 
governmnent, atomic bombs." He added, "I have sometimes asked m.yself 
whether we can find any analogy to this situation in the practice of 
the monastic orders that devote a part of their attention and derive 
part of their sustenance from the making of their private liquers."6) 
Operating in the shadow of Los Alamos but also products of the war were 
several university-connected laboratories under DOD sponsorship. 
Typical of them were the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California 
Institute of Technology and the Applied Physics Laboratory of The Johns 
Hopkins University, the former a ward of Army Ordnance, the latter of 
Navy Ordnance -- and both devoted to basic research related to the 
learned to use scientists since the war and was managing to get and 
keep good ones. William T.Golden, "Notes of Conversations re Study of 
Military and Scientific Research and Scientific Mobilization," 
[Sept./Oct. 1950: conversation with Manley, Sept. 21, 1950], Golden MSS. 
6 J. Robert Oppenheimer, UnC01l1llon Sense, eds., N. Metropolis, 
Gian-Carlo Rota, and David Sharp (1984), p. 30. 
6 
development of guided missiles. 7 
Defense research loomed large everywhere in the civilian 
scientific sector. The military supplied about 15% of the Bell 
Telephone Laboratory budget. It spent $350 million dollars on research 
in industrial laboratories, accounting for about 25% of the total 
dollar perfo~ance in the industrial R&D sector. About two thirds of 
the budget of the National Bureau of Standards came from other 
government agencies, mainly the military. The nominally civilian 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had been reallocated in the 
u.s. Code from Title 49, "Transportation," to Title 50, ''War,'' partly 
in recognition that its budgetary growth had been based "entirely on 
military considerations."8 The Army Signal Corps sustained the MIT 
Research Laboratory in Electronics -- 85% of the MIT research budget 
7 Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space program: A History 
of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1982), pp. 18-34; Michael Aaron 
Dennis, "No Fixed position: university Laboratories and Military 
Patronage at Johns Hopkins and MIT, 1944-46," unpublished paper (1987). 
Army Ordnance's sponsorship of JPL expressed sharply the change in the 
military's attitude toward civilian science. The footsoldier's Army had 
long been the most backward of the services with respect to scientific 
research. Ordnance, which received about two thirds of Army R&D funds, 
had traditionally been prone to rely on its own laboratories, such as 
the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and to distrust civilian establishments. 
William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Meeting with Roger W. Jones, 
Assistant Director in Charge of Legislative Reference, Bureau of the 
Budget," Oct. 11, 1950, Golden MSS. See the cornnents on contract-
operated government laboratories in Oliver Buckley to the President, 
May 1, 1952, attached to Science Advisory Committee, "Sunmary, Meeting 
No. II," May 9, 1952, C!K MSS, Box 256, folder 12. 
8 William T. Golden, Mano to File, "Conversation with E. U. 
Condon, Director, National Bureau of Standards, and Messrs. Hugh 
Odishaw and N.E. Golovin, Assistants to the Director," Oct. 31, 1950, 
p.3, Golden MSS; "Research and Development in the United States, 1941-
1952," table attached to Oliver Buckly to James Killian, Oct. 26, 1951, 
C!K MSS, Box 256, folder 10; Forman, "Behind Quantun Electronics" 
(1987), p. 211; Roland, Model Research (1985), I, 260-61. 
7 
carne fram the military and the AEC -- the Radiation Laboratory at 
Columbia, and the Croft Laboratory at Harvard. The Atomic Energy 
Commission funded the big accelerator installations at the Radiation 
Laboratory, in Berkeley, and at Brookhaven. The AEC was also 
supporting same 800 fellowships a year in the physical and biomedical 
sciences, while the Office of Naval Research -- by far the principal 
military patron of academic science and currently the sponsor of some 
1200 research projects in abnost 200 universities was assisting 
some 2,500 science students towards their Ph.D.s. In 1949, the Defense 
Department together with the AEC accounted for 96 percent of all 
federal dollars spent on the campuses for research in the physical 
sciences. For every two of those dollars spent by the AEC, the military 
spent at least three. 9 
The powerful military patronage of academic science worried a 
number of the nation's scientific leaders. In 1949, Lee DuBridge, the 
head of the Radiation Laboratory at MIT during the war and now the 
president of the California Institute of Technology, declared, '~en 
science is allowed to exist merely from the crumbs that fall from the 
table of a weapons development program then science is headed into the 
stifling atmosphere of 'mobilized secrecy' and it is surely doomed -
9 Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), pp. 156, 204, 186-
7; Chart, "Research and Development Obligations of the Department of 
Defense," Fig.2, attached to "Science Advisory Comnittee, Surrmary, Mtg. 
No.3," Sept. 18, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 10; Kevles, The 
Physicists (1987), pp. 355, 359; William T. Golden, Memos to File, 
"Conversation with Kenneth Pitzer, Director, Research Division, AEC," 
Oct. 31, 1950, p. 1; "Conversation with Rear Admiral T. Solberg, 
Director of Office of Naval Research," Jan. 15, 1951 as of Jan. 10, 
1951, p. 1, Golden MSS. 
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even though the crumbs themselves should provide more than adequate 
nourishment." Unversity scientists were constantly -- and rightly --
apprehensive that the military might impose security restrictions on 
their research. Some worried that the military's overwhelming presence 
in university science would distort its intellectual direction. 10 
However, DOD supported not only basic research recognized, to quote a 
later Defense Department directive, "as an integral part of programmed 
research conmited to specific military aims"; it also provided a good 
deal of money for projects in pure science free of most restrictions, 
security or otherwise. In any case, in March 1950 President Harry S 
Truman signed into law the bill establishing the National Science 
Foundation, which was intended to be the flagship of fundamental 
science in the united States and was expected in many quarters to take 
over much of the pure-research activity of the military.11 
While all this patronage gave the military leverage over the 
course of civilian science, in the postwar period civilian scientists 
also gained influence in the shaping of policy for the technology of 
national security. Some of the influence arose from consultantships 
and summer studies, like that begun in late 1949 by the MIT physicist 
Jerrold R. Zacharias ,~who agreed to head an investigati:en for ONR on 
ocean transport and antisubmarine warfare. (The study, conducted during 
10 Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), p. 185; Kevles, 
The Physicists, pp. 378-79; 
11 Depart:rrent of Defense Directive, "Policy on Basic Research," 
June 19, 1952, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 13; Kevles, The Physicsts, p. 
356; William T. Golden, Memo to Files, "Conversation with Dr. Vannevar 
Bush," Dec. 5, 1950, Golden MSS. 
9 
the summer of 1950, was dubbed Project Hartwell, because the civilian 
scientists who carried it out dined frequently at the Hartwell Fanus 
Restaurant, which was near the MIT field station in Lexington, 
Massachusetts, where they did the work.) 12 Some of the influence also 
derived from participation in analytical service cadres for planning 
and evaluating weapons systems. The Anmy had an Operational Research 
Office; the Navy, the Operational Evaluation Group. The Air Force had 
several groups of such experts attached to its various commands and 
also the RAND Corporation, in Santa Monica, California. At the top of 
the aDned services, attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the 
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) , comprising some 25 civilian 
scientists along with an equivalent number of military officers. More 
general policy influence came from participation in key standing 
scientific advisory committees. In the most portentous area, there was 
the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, which 
was loaded with world-class physicists. In the workaday areas of 
practical military postures, there were, notably, the Air Force 
Scientific Advisory Committee, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, 
and the Army Scientific Advisory Panel, each populated by prominent 
scientists and engineers from industry as well as academia. 13 
12 Hartwell ran formally from March through December 1950 and cost 
$124,000, much of which went to pay the summer salaries of the 21 
civilian scientists responsible for the study. T. J. Crane to James R. 
Killian, July 23, 1954, C!K MSS, Box 257, folder 18; Jerrold R. 
Zacharias, with Myles Gordon, "Military Technology: One of the Lives of 
J.R. Zacharias," ms of a draft autobiography (1986), chapter I. 
13 Kevles, The Physicists (1987), p. 355; Herbert York and Alan 
Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar History" (1977), 
pp. 16-17; William C. Foster to John Stennis, April 23, 1952, C!K MSS, 
10 
The most wide-ranging and, at least nominally, powerful 
defense-science advisory group was the Research and Development Board 
(ROB), which had been established by the National Security Act of 1947 
to advise the secretary of defense upon the progress and needs of 
scientific research and development in connection with national 
security. While the RDB comprised representatives of each of the armed 
services, it was by law headed by a civilian. It was empowered, among 
other things, to consider and advise the Joint Chiefs upon the 
interaction of R&D with strategy. It was, in short, designed to 
institutionalize Bush's vision of a coequal interplay between civilian 
scientists and professional military officers in the formation of 
policies for the development and use of new weapons. 14 Indeed, Bush 
had been its first chairman, and he was succeeded, in 1948, by Karl T. 
Compton, the prominent physicist, president of MIT, veteran of the 
wartime OSRD, and Bush's good friend. When Compton took office, 
Box 256, folder 12; William T. Golden, who was surveying defense 
research, noted, "Advisory comnittees are becoming increasingly 
fashionable." Golden, Memos to File, "Conversation with Brigadier 
General L.E. Simon and Major General A.C. McAuliffe," March 1, 1951 as 
of Feb. 28, 1951, p. 3; File, "Conversation with H.P. Robertson, Deputy 
Director, WSEG; Dr. Louis Ridenour, Special Adviser to the Secretary of 
the Air Force and to the Director of Research and Development of the 
Air Force; am Professor Marshall Stone," Dec. 8, 1950, pp. 1-2; 
"Conversation with Lt. General Hull and Dr. Robertston, Director and 
Deputy Director of the Weapons System Evaluation Group," Nov. 21, 1950 
as of Nov. 15, 1950, p.l, Golden MSS. 
14 U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 61 (1947), Pt. 1, pp. 506-7. The 
revision of the National Security Act, in 1949, left the duties of the 
Board virtually unchanged. U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 63 (1949), Pt. 
1, pp. 584-85. The ROB replaced the Joint Research am Development 
Board, which had been established in 1946 and which was, in turn, an 
outgrowth of the wartime Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment. 
York and Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar History" 
(1977),14-15. 
11 
secretary of Defense James Forrestal told him that, in his view, the 
chairman of the RDB was "the center in the National Military 
Establishment of the application of science to war," his principal 
adviser in that area, and essential to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 
introducing into war planning adequate consideration of the evolution 
of weapons. 15 
By 1949, as a result of directives from the Secretary of 
Defense, the RDB was charged with drawing up and putting into effect a 
"complete and integrated program of research and development for 
military purposes." It was also to keep tabs on the activities and 
budgets of the various individual service agencies, and force shifts in 
their programmatic emphases if necessary. To carry out these 
considerable duties, the RDB had a full-time staff of about 250 people, 
distributed over numerous committees, which called upon same 2,500 
civilian and military individuals for advice. 16 
In early November, 1949, Compton, who was about to leave the 
chairmanship of the RDB for reasons of ill health, summarized the 
defense research situation to President Truman and pronounced it good. 
In the preceding year, not only had the RDB reported to the Joint 
Chiefs on the status of every R&D item that might impinge upon future 
military strategy but, in cooperation with the Joint Chiefs, it had 
15 Forrestal to Compton, Sept. 30, 1948, C/K MSS, Box 245, folder 
16. 
16 Secretary of Defense [Louis Johnson], 'TIirective Research and 
Developnent Board," Sept. 14, 1949, c/K MSS, Box 245, folder 17; 
William T. Golden, Memo to File, "RDB - Conversations with Messrs. 
Loomis, Walker, and Cornell," Nov. 13, 1950 as of Nov. 10, 1950, Golden 
MSS. 
12 
prepared a systematic plan for military R&D "based on the strategic 
thinking of the Joint Chiefs," a plan that the departments and the 
Board had used in preparing their budget estimates. Particularly 
exciting to Compton, it had been possible to recommend a military R&D 
program for the next year that was not significantly affected by 
shortages in technical personnel. The postwar shortage had eased 
considerably. Henceforth, Compton hoped, the military R&D budget could 
be "determined on the basis of military value in the light of national 
policy, rather than by the more arbitrary standards which of neccesity 
had to be applied previously." 17 
About two months before Compton wrote his summary, the 
President announced that the Soviet Union had detonated its first 
atomic bomb. Later in 1949, China was declared to have "fallen" to the 
control of the Communists under Mao Tse Tung. But while the budget of 
the AEC was expanded considerably and a commitment to a crash hydrogen-
bomb development program was made, there was no overall increase of 
funding or activity in the non-nuclear area of defense research. Quite 
the contrary: The general defense R&D budget had already fallen from 
$530 million in fiscal 1949 to $510 million in fiscal 1950. The Truman 
administration recommended for fiscal 1951 its lowest overall military 
17 Campton to the President, Nov. 2, 1949, C!K MSS, Box 245, 
folder 17. Even Vannevar Bush thought that defense research was in 
pretty good shape, certainly in far better shape than it had been in 
1940. William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with Vannevar 
Bush," Oct. 24, 1950, p. 3, Golden MSS. In the view of insiders, the 
RDB was thought actually to control all DOD R&D funds. See William T. 
Golden, "Notes of Conversations re Study of Millitary and Scientific 
Research," [Sept./Oct. 1950], especially the conversations with Willis 
Shapley and John Manley, Golden MSS. 
13 
budget since the end of the war. In the spring of 1950, Congress 
approved the budget virtually unchanged, including funds for defense 
R&D virtually unchanged from the previous year, meaning lower 
absolutely than in fiscal 1949 and, in constant dollars, lower still. 
Beneficiaries of ONR support of basic research were apprehensive, and 
rightly so. The ample patronage that ONR was providing academic science 
had its critics at the highest levels of the Navy; indeed, the Navy's 
General Board had delivered itself of the opinion that "expenditures 
for this purpose should be assigned a relatively lower priority if 
further curtailment of the total research and development budget is 
necessary. "18 
Then, too, despite Compton's optimism, the armed services were 
by no means making civilian scientists full partners in their strategic 
planning. The physicist Lawrence Hafstad, a civilian scientific insider 
as head of the Reactor Development Division of the AEC, judged that the 
Navy was generally disinclined to admit scientific outsiders to its 
high councils. In Hafstad's view, both Army and Navy Ordnance were 
still ruled by tight, exclusionary cliques. The Air Force, reportedly, 
kept trying to have the weapons System Evaluation Group eliminated. 19 
18 York and Greb, "Military Research and Development" (1977), p. 
17; Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), pp. 157-58 and n. 13; 
Karl Compton, "The Research and Development Budget of the Department of 
Defense," Oct. 30, 1950, attached to canpton to E. o. Lawrence et aI, 
Oct. 31, 1950, CIK MSS, Box 245, folder 19; Harvey Sapolsky, "Academic 
Science and the Military: the Years Since the Second World War," in 
Reingold, ed., The Sciences in the American Context (1979), pp. 387-88. 
19 William T. Golden, Memos to Files, "Conversation with Dr. 
Lawrence Hafstad, Director, Reactor Development Division, Atomic Energy 
Cornnission," Nov. 8, 1950, p. 2; "Telephone Conversation with Dr. H.P. 
Robertson," Jan. 25, 1951, Golden MSS. 
14 
And the Research and Development Board was in trouble. In part, the 
difficulties of the RDB derived from the immensity of the job it had 
taken on -- the policing of the entire defense R&D budget --which many 
of its civilian scientific members and consultants found daunting and 
which earned it the enmity of a number of anmed service branches. The 
Board also suffered from lack of leadership between Compton's 
resignation and the appointment of his successor, William Webster, a 
1920 graduate of the Naval Academy and a 1924 alumnus of MIT, who had 
spent his post-Navy days mainly in the electrical utilities industry, 
and World War II in OSRD. But once Webster took office, early in 1950, 
he found that he was only rarely invited to sit with the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff during their deliberations on R&D and he felt himself very 
much an outsider. 20 
Thus, on the eve of the Korean War, what civilian scientists 
took to be the requirements of defense R&D had not been entirely 
fulfilled. While the military's involvement in civilian' science was 
decidedly more substantial than it had been in 1940, its devotion to 
enlarging the pool of fundamental knowledge was questionable and its 
20 Karl Campton to the President, Nov. 2, 1949, R. F. Rinehart to 
Hanson W. Baldwin, Feb. 4, 1950, C!K MSS, Box 245, folders 17, 19; 
William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with Mr. William 
Webster, Chairman, Research and Development Board, Department of 
Defense, Nov. I, 1950, Golden MSS. According to Admiral Arthur C. 
Davis, the director of staff for the Joint Chiefs, the chiefs did not 
as a group concern themselves with the details of new or improved 
weapons, nor with their implications for war plans. Golden, Memo to 
File, "Notes of Conversations re Study of Military and Scientific 
Research and Scientific Mobilization," [Sept./Oct. 1950], Golden 
MSS.The dissatisfaction with the participation of civilian scientists 
in strategic planning is evident in Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free 
Men, (1949), pp. 251-53, 261. 
15 
resources for the purpose were limited. Moreover, the armed services on 
the whole remained committed to their traditional insistence upon 
controlling defense R&D and equally traditional reluctance to cooperate 
with civilian scientists in strategic planning. 2l Still, in the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the Applied Physics Laboratory, the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, and wherever else civilian scientists were tied to the 
military but independent of its close control, radical new weapons 
the hydrogen bomb, certain types of guided missiles, and a variety of 
other hardware innovations -- were aborning. All suggested what 
institutionalized civilian science might -- for better or for worse 
contribute to national defense, given enough resources and proper 
integration into national defense planning. 
* * * * * * * 
The outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, provoked a mood 
of gri~faced preparedness among policymakers in the united States. If 
the Soviets had previously seemed to rely on subversion to achieve 
their aims, now they were perceived to threaten the west with armed 
aggression -- a challenge that demanded not only a major and immediate 
increase in military strength but, perhaps, an even larger boost in 
defense R&D. Karl Compton reflecting, in October 1950, on the defense 
21 William T. Golden, Memo to Files, "Conversation with Dr. 
Lawrence Hafstad, Director, Reactor Development Division, Atomic Energy 
Commission," Nov. 8, 1950, p. 2. For the difficulties that scientists 
faced in the strategic planning area during World War II, see Kevles, 
The Physicists (1987), pp. 309~323. 
16 
research budget, noted the "danger of military aggression, like Korea, 
in other quarters, which could lead to piecemeal defeat or all-out war" 
and added: "The united states cannot match its potential adversary in 
numbers. • Our main source of military superiority is in those 
technological developments which multiply the per capita fighting 
effectiveness of our forces." 22 
In short order, the defense R&D budget followed the overall 
defense budget into the stratosphere, doubling to slightly more than 
$1.3 billion in fiscal 1951, and rising still higher, to about $1.6 
billion in fiscal 1952. By late 1951, it was est~ted that DOD and AEC 
contracts accounted for nearly 40 percent of all industrial and 
academic research effort. Defense research was est~ted to be 
occupying some two thirds of the nation 1 s scientists and engineers. At 
the American Physical Society meeting earlier that year, perhaps the 
principal non-technical topic of conversation was the wholesale and 
high-powered recruiting of scientists by defense agencies, especially 
the Air Force. Planners were once again concerned with shortages of 
technical manpower, and the draft status of young scientists, 
particularly in such critical fields as nuclear physics and 
electronics, was once again a matter of policy debate. 23 
22 Compton, "The Research and Developrrent Budget of the Department 
of Defense," Oct. 30, 1950, attached to Canpton to E. o. Lawrence, 
Oct. 31, 1950, C/K MSS, Box 245, folder 19. 
23 Oliver E. Buckley, "An Appraisal of Some Indicated Needs of 
Defense Research •• • ," Dec. 31, 1951, attached to "Science Advisory 
Conmittee, Sumnary of Meeting No.6," Dec. 11, 1951; Karl T. Compton, 
"The Research and Development Budget of the Department of Defense," 
Oct. 30, 1950, attached to Compton to E. O. Lawrence, Oct. 31, 1950, 
CjK MSS, Box 256, folder IIi Box 245, folder 19; William T. Golden, 
17 
A series of administrative moves inside DOD expressed the sense 
of technological emergency. In mid-1950, Secretary of Defense Louis 
Johnson attempted to beef up the Research and Development Board by 
allocating $25 million in the Board's fiscal 1952 budget for 
distribution to deparbmental R&D programs. In February 1951, Secretary 
of Defense George C. Marshall formally enlarged the Board's powers in a 
directive that authorized it to "originate research work" of military 
value for which the various armed services had no projects. 24 
(However, the enormous increase in the defense program further 
overwhelmed the oversight capacities of the Board. To cope, Chairman 
William Webster concluded that, "instead of striving to achieve the 
soundest possible balance within a total research and development 
program bounded by a fixed over-all dollar limit, we must now seek to 
insure that we recognize the major challenges to research and 
development, that no stone is left unturned to meet these challenges." 
In his view, the RDB comnittees ought no longer to engage in "routine 
scrutiny" but to focus their attention on programs of "greatest 
consequence.") 25 
Memo to File, "Conversation with Dr. Robert F. Bacher," Feb. 6, 1951 as 
of Feb. 3, 1951, p. 2, Golden MSS; Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" 
(1987), p. 167, n. 32. 
24 William Webster to Robert E. Wilson, July 6, 1950; 'Directive 
Research and Developnent Board," Feb. 1, 1951, C!K MSS, Box 245, folder 
19; Box 246, folder 4. 
25 William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with Mr. William 
Webster," Dec. 20, 1950 as of Dec. 18, 1950, Golden MSS; K. T. Canpton 
to Robert P. Russell, Dec. 26, 1950; William Webster, "Memorandum for 
Chairmen, RDB Committees, Draft 143, Jan. 9, 1951, C!K MSS, Box 246, 
folder 2, folder 3. 
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In 1950, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall established an 
Office of the Director of Guided Missiles in the Defense Department and 
appointed as head of it the industrialist K.T. Keller, who quickly 
became known as the ''missile czar." Civilian scientists were brought in 
and given authority at the top of the Air Force and an independent 
Research and Development Command was created at Wright Field. In March 
1950, the Air Force was given exclusive jurisdiction over the 
development of long-range strategic missiles. In the meantime, the Army 
and Navy accelerated their short-range missile programs. The Army 
transferred a team of missile engineers to the Huntsville Arsenal, in 
Huntsville, Alabama, where, under Wehrner von Braun, work commenced on 
the development of a tactical ballistic missile. In Pasadena, 
California, the Jet propulsion Laboratory obtained authorization fram 
Army Ordnance to move beyond basic research into the development of the 
Corporal guided missile, which would be designed for tactical use 
carrying atomic warheads in the European theater. Between 1950 and 
1953, the JPL budget more than doubled, to $11 million a year, and its 
staff similarly multiplied. 26 
The expansion in defense R&D prompted the administration to 
came to grips with a variety of issues in the mobilization and 
management of civilian science, same of them predating the outbreak of 
26 York and Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar 
History" (1977), pp. 17-18; Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons 
Innovatior. (1969), pp. 26-27; Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense 
controvers~ (1977), pp. 37-38; William T. Golden, Memos to File, 
"Conversatlon with Mr. William A. Burden and Henry Loomis," Jan. 30, 
1951; "Conversation with ••• Burden," Feb. 27, 1951 as of Feb. 18, 
1951, Golden MSS; Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program (1982), 
pp. 43-48. 
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the Korean War. There was the approaching activation of the National 
Science Foundation. There was the recommendation to create a new OSRD 
in the event of another war emergency, a move that had been urged in 
a June 1950 report from a committee of the RDB chaired by Irvin 
Stewart, who had been a high-ranking aide to Vannevar Bush in World War 
II. There was the suggestion -- it had originated with George F. Hines, 
a lobbyist for the state of Massachusetts and an associate of 
Congressman John McCormack, Majority Leader of the House of 
Representatives, who brought it to the attention of the President 
that all military R&D should be under the direction of civilians and 
independent of the armed services. In mid-october 1950, the director of 
the Bureau of the Budget reminded Truman of all these issues, pointing 
out in addition "the emphasis which the increasing responsibilities of 
the U.S.A. in world affairs places on the relationship between 
strategic plans and scientific research and deve1op:nent" and urging a 
review of all activities related to defense science. The review was to 
be conducted by William T. Golden, an investment banker in New York 
City and devotee of science. Truman approved the review on October 20, 
1950, and Golden went promptly to his task. 27 
Golden worked assiduously, discussing the intricacies of 
defense R&D with dozens of people, including officers in all the armed 
27 William T. Golden, Memos to File, "Meeting with Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett," Oct. 17, 1950; "Meeting with 
George F. Hines," Oct. 10, 1950; F. J. Lawton [director, Bureau of the 
Budget], "Memorandum for the President: Scientific Research and 
Development of Military Significance," Oct. 19, 1950, Golden MSS. The 
report of the Stewart Comnittee was: "Report of the Comnittee on Plans 
for Mobilizing Science," June 26, 1950, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 8. 
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services as well as academic, industrial, and governmental scientists. 
He concluded that there was no need at the moment for a new OSRD --
defense research was generally vast and well in hand -- though, in the 
event of another war emergency, there might be need for a new one, to 
provide a place, he reported to the President in December 1950, for 
"the successful wildcats of science" who might devise radically new 
weapons yet feel uncomfortable in a military organization. 28 But 
Golden did come quickly to think that something was required to bring 
civilian scientific expertise to bear upon the problems of national 
defense. 
His conviction was no doubt strengthened by -- and perhaps 
originated in his discovery of -- the weaknesses of the Research and 
Development Board. Both his military and his civilian confidants 
stressed how the Board had been engulfed by the expansion of the 
defense R&D budget, that it commanded little respect among the 
professional military, accomplished little of significance, and was not 
much involved in deliberations upon the relationship of technological 
development and strategic policy. In his December report to Truman, 
Golden urged that what was in order, given the vast diversity of 
defense R&D, was a Science Adviser to the President -- someone informed 
about all the research of military relevance going on in and out of the 
government, someone who could initiate a new OSRD if and when its 
28 William T. Golden, "Memorandum for the President: Mobilizing 
Science for War: A Scientific Adviser to the president," Dec. 18, 1950, 
Golden MSS. 
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creation was required. 29 
Golden's idea of a presidential science adviser had been 
endorsed by a number of his confidants, but not by several members of 
the National Science Board of the new -- weakly-funded and thus fragile 
-- National Science Foundation. By its authorizing act, the Foundation 
was supposed, in part, to secure the national defense; the dubious 
Board members -- they included James B. Conant, the President of 
Harvard University -- feared that the creation of a presidential 
science adviser would tend to debase the NSF. Golden argued to the 
Board, citing his numerous conversations, that the consensus of 
defense-research officials was that the NSF could best serve the 
country if it left military matters to other agencies and concentrated 
on fostering the advancement of basic science -- a position that the 
Board adopted at a meeting in February 1951. 30 Golden's idea ran into 
29 William T. Golden, Memos to Files, "Conversations with Drs. 
Oppenheimer, Robert Bacher, and Charles Lauritsen," Dec. 21, 1950; 
"Conversation with Dr. Ellis Johnson and George Shortley, Director and 
Deputy Director, Operational Research Organization, U.S. Army ••• ," 
Nov. 21, 1950; "Conversation with Dr. Ellis A. Johnson ••• ," Oct. 31, 
1950; "Conversation with General Maris' staff and General McAuliffe, 
Chief of the Chemical Corps," Feb. 19, 1951; William T. Golden, 
"Memorandum for the President: Mobilizing Science for War: A Scientific 
Adviser to the President," Dec. 18, 1950, Golden MSS. It is interesting 
to note that, in April 1951, Webster suggested as an individual that 
the Board needed to be reshaped, mainly by absolving it of 
responsibility for detailed oversight of the different military 
branches, making it into a high council on defense technology policy, 
and adding to it more civilian scientists. Webster, Memorandum for 
General Marshall, April 24, 1951, C!K MSS, Box 246, folder 4. 
30 William T. Golden, Memos to File, "Meeting with Conant, 
Stauffacher and Staats and Carey and Levi at Bureau of Budget," Jan. 5, 
1951; "Telephone Conversation with William Webster," Jan. 4, 1951; 
"Conversation with I. I. Rabi," Jan. 5, 1951; Bronk, "Science Advice in 
the White House," in Golden, ed., Science Advice to the President, 
(1980), pp. 248-49. 
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a different type of opposition from General Lucius Clay, who was 
assistant director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and who freely 
conceded to Golden that his vision of militarily related scientific 
possibilities had in the past been limited. In Clay's view, any science 
adviser would deal with issues of mobilization; therefore, the post 
should be located in the Office of Defense Mobilization, with its 
occupant appointed an assistant to the director. 3l 
In the end, Golden prevailed, though so did Clay, to an extent. 
On April 19, 1951, President Truman established, in the Office of 
Defense Mobilization, a Science Advisory Committee to provide advice 
not only to the director of the Office but to himself on scientific 
matters, particularly in connection with national defense. The advisory 
group comprised eleven leading scientists, including, as chairman, 
Oliver E. Buckley, who had just stepped down as president of the Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, and DuBridge, Conant, Oppenheimer, Webster, 
Alan Waterman (the head of NSF), James R. Killian (the president of 
MIT), and Detlev W. Bronk (the president of The Johns Hopkins 
University and head of the National Academy of Sciences). Taken 
together, the group represented key veterans -- many of them physicists 
of the scientific mobilization during World War II and key players 
in the postwar national security policyrnaking. 32 
31 William T. Golden, Memos to File, "Conversation with General 
Lucius Clay," Jan. 19, 1951, Jan. 26, 1951; Detlev W. Bronk, "Science 
Advice in the White House," in William T. Golden, ed., Science Advice 
to the President (1980), p. 250. 
32 Truman to Oliver Buckley, April 19, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 256, 
folder 8; Press Release, April 20, 1951, Golden MSS. 
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Some time in April, Buckley saw the President, who assured him 
that he could have access to the Oval Office at any time and who 
applauded a set of operating principles for the committee that Buckley 
had drawn up, particularly the principle that the group would "avoid 
fanfare" and "minimize public appearances." In truth, the principles 
were on the whole a recipe for passivity. Not surprisingly, Buckley, a 
self-effacing man, wrote to the membership that the committee would be 
"limited largely to policy and other general matters," adding, "It 
cannot be relied on as the principal source of imaginative, technical 
leadership in the government."33 The corrmittee met roughly once a 
month, carrying on with no staff assistance other than an executive 
secretary and a clerical assistant. In Buckley's view, the corrmittee 
was in no position even to think about coming to grips with the 
nation's defense research program. 
In its first year, the group delivered itself of several 
unexceptional opinions on issues concerning the mobilization of 
science -- for example, that universities best served the national 
defense by training scientists and advancing knowledge and various 
observations upon the difficulty of getting scientists comparable in 
stature to the leaders of OSRD to work in the Defense Department. Such 
matters occupied the corrmittee's first report to the President, which 
Buckley hand-delivered to Truman on May 5, 1952 and which Truman said, 
in a note a few days later, that he had read with interest. Lee 
33 "Proposed Principles for Corrmittee," April 5, 1951, attached to 
Buckley to Killian, April 25, 1951, C!K MSS, Box 256, folder 8; Bronk, 
"Science Advice in the White House," in Golden, ed., Science Advice to 
the President (1980), p. 251. 
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DuBridge recalled, "Buckley didn't want the comnittee to do anything 
except figure out what scientists might do in another war emergency. 
The rest of us were frustrated. We didn't see much point in just 
writing reports for a file drawer.,,34 
The tenor of the committee's deliberations changed 
dramatically after June 1952, when Buckley resigned from the 
chairmanship for reasons of ill health and was succeeded by Lee 
Dubridge. After the first two meetings over which DuBridge presided, in 
mid-June and mid-September 1952, the committee was resolved to deal 
with key issues of science and the state -- how to increase the 
effectiveness of defense science and to get science and technology more 
involved with policymaking. By the time of the comnitte's next meeting, 
early November, Dwight Eisenhower had been elected president. Towards 
the end of a three-day conclave at the Institute of Advanced Study, in 
Princeton, New Jersey, a summary of the group's conclusions was drawn 
up with the aim of somehow getting them to the President-elect. In the 
view of the Princeton gathering, there was no point in continuing the 
comnittee as currently conceiVed. However, it wished to stress that 
there was an acute need to bring scientific expertise to bear upon 
national security planning and it proposed mechanisms to illustrate how 
34 Science Advisory Committee, "Surnmary, Meeting No.1," May 12, 
1951; "Summary, Meeting No.2," June 23, 1951; "Summary, Meeting No. 
3," Sept. 8, 1951 and attached "Scientists and Mobilization, Some Views 
of the Science Advisory Committee"; Oliver E. Buckley, "An Appraisal of 
Some Indicated Needs of Defense Research, A Memorandum for Discussion," 
attached to "Summary, Meeting No.6," Dec. 3, 1951; Buckley to the 
President, May 1, 1952, attached to "Surrmary, Meeting No. 11," May 9, 
1952; Buckley to Killian, July 24, 1951, c/K MSS, Box 256, folders 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12; author's conversation with Lee DuBridge, July 15, 1988. 
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that end might be achieved. 35 
In the following weeks, DuBridge pressed the committee's views 
upon Arthur S. Flemming, who would became the new director of the 
Office of Defense Mobilization, and, on December 17, DuBridge and 
Oppenheimer spent an hour and a half discussing them with an attentive 
Nelson Rockefeller, who was looking into the organization of the 
executive branch of the government for the President-elect and who, at 
the end of the month conveyed the commmittee's views directly to 
Eisenhower. Eisenhower responded favorably to the ideas; so did Robert 
Cutler, a special assistant to the President, who was handling matters 
concerning the National Security Council. 36 
Neither Eisenhower nor Cutler seemed particularly interested in 
the mechanisms that the committee proposed for establishing high-level 
scientific advice. What they apparently cared about was obtaining that 
advice for national-security policymaking. Nothing in the institutional 
35 -Lee A. DuBridge, Memorandum to Members and Consultants, Science 
Advisory Committee, Sept. 16, 1952; Science Advisory Committee, 
"Summary, Meeting No. 14," Nov. 7, 8, 9, 1952 and attached ''Draft 
Conclusion," Nov. 9, 1952, CjK MSS, Box 256, folder 13. See also 
Det1ev W. Bronk, "Science Advice in the White House," in Golden, ed., 
Science Advice to the President (1980), pp. 252-53. Bronk here 
remembers that at the November meeting the committee sought to relocate 
itself more closely to the president, specifically in the National 
Security Council. However, one of the mechanisms proposed involved the 
Secretary of Defense; the other, participation in a new high council on 
foreign and defense policy. Bronk seems to confuse the outcome of the 
Princeton conclave with that of a later one, in 1955. See DuBridge to 
Killian, Dec. 16, 1955; "Sumnary of Meeting of an Ad Hoc Group on 
Science Organization, Sponsored by the SAC," Nov. 25, 1955, attached to 
David Z. Beckler, "Notes on Science Organization and National Policy," 
CjK MSS, Box 257, folder 21. 
36 DuBridge to Members and Consultants, Science Advisory Committee 
••• , Jan. 5, 1953; April 20, 1953, cjK MSS, Box 256, folder 14. 
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arrangement of the Science Advisory Committee was modified, but there 
was a distinct change in the scope and level of duties given it. In 
August 1953, a month after the end of the Korean War, Cutler, now head 
of the National Security Council, and Flemming arranged for the 
committee to meet in the Executive Office Building, next to the White 
House, to be briefed by members of the NSC staff and to provide advice 
on matters pertaining to air defense. DuBridge wrote to the committee 
members, "You will all recognize what an important assignment this is. 
It is the first assignment to our Committee under the new 
administration and this meeting will give us all a chance to become 
acquainted with the menbers of the OOM and NSC staffs with whom we may 
possibly be working during coming years."37 
* * * * * * * 
During the election, the Republican Party had hammered the 
Democrats on the issues of Korea, Communism, and Corruption -- KIC2, in 
the shorthand of the campaign. But if frustration with the 
protractedness of Kl influenced the outcome of the election, the war 
also fostered a series of subtle -- and not so subtle -- changes in S2: 
the relationship between science and the American state. 
Unlike World War II, the scientific mobilization during Korea 
had produced no miraculous new weapons. Combined with the soviet's 
becoming a nuclear power, however, it generated a pervasive psychology 
37 DuBridge to Science Advisory Committee Members, August 7, 1953, 
CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 14. 
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of permanent mobilization, a commibment to an expansive technological 
readiness. Even during the war, the military's outlook had struck James 
B. Conant, as he told the National War College, as "something like the 
old religious phenomenon of conversion." Conant continued, "The 
military, if anything, have become vastly too much impressed with the 
abilities of research and development. They are no longer the 
conservatives. • • at times they seem to be fanatics in their belief of 
what the scientists and the technologists can do."38 
On the side of civilian science, the psychological sea change 
was typically manifest in the conclusions of Project Hartwell. Though 
Korea had no direct bearing on the content of the project, Zacharias 
recalled, the conflict "heightened our sense of purpose and underlined 
the relevance and the urgency of the task -- what it takes to fight 
half way around the world." The thick, two-volume Hartwell report dealt 
with what the Navy should do to protect shipping against Soviet forces 
in a war with theaters that spread from Europe and Latin America to 
India, Southeast Asia, and Japan. It assumed that the Soviets would be 
38 Conant, "The Problem of Evaluation of Scientific Research and 
Developnent for Military Planning," speech to the National War College, 
Feb. 1, 1952, quoted in James G. Hershberg, "'Over My Dead Body': James 
B. Conant and the Hydrogen Bomb," unpublished ms (1987), forthcaning, 
p. 50. Conant suggested to a meeting of the Science Advisory Committee 
that, in order to get better control of military research, at key 
levels every proposal for a new defense R&D project should have at 
least one designated naysayer to make a case against it. Science 
Advisory Corrmittee, "Sl.lll1l1ary, Meeting No.7," Jan. 11, 1952, CIK MSS, 
Box 256, folder 12. Louis Ridenour, a physicist who was special adviser 
to the Secretary of the Air Force, told William Golden that any kind of 
project, no matter how far-fetched, could count on finding support in 
some branch of the military. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with 
H.P. Robertson • • • i Louis Ridenour • •• ," Dec. 8, 1950, Golden MSS. 
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well anmed and prepared to use all their weapons. 39 
The Hartwell analyses, which ranged from technologies for the 
destruction as well as for the detection of submarines, paid particular 
attention to nuclear weapons. Zacharias recalled, "We wanted the 
military to start thinking about how to integrate atomic weapons into 
the battle plan of 'a conventional war,' a protracted affair, in which 
both sides would have ample opportunity and time to gear up, get 
prepared, and deploy forces -- without devastating destruction on both 
sides." The report sought to destroy certain myths about nuclear 
weapons, starting with the myth that all were big bombs deliverable 
only from big high-flying aircraft. Hartwell stressed that they could 
be built small, in both size and explosive power, and that they would 
be appropriate for use against submarines and their bases by a variety 
of small aircraft, including helicopters. Project Hartwell did not 
think it unreasonable for the united States to seek to equip itself 
soon with 10,000 such atomic weapons. 40 Hartwell decidedly influenced 
Navy R&D as well as its antisubmarine doctrine (though the impact on 
the latter has been difficult to measure because of security 
restrictions). Suffice it to say that years later, naval officers 
treasured the Hartwell report as the bible of antisubmarine warfare. 4l 
The change in administrations -- and, for the first time in 
twenty years, the change in parties -- brought fresh players, fresh 
39 Zacharias, with Myles Gordon, "Military Technology: One of the 




arrangements, and fresh doctrines into the defense policy game. A key 
fresh arrangement was mandated by the Defense Reorganization Act of 
1953, which abolished the Research and Development Board and created 
two new assistant secretaries of defense, one for Research and 
Development, the other for Applications Engineering. The salient fresh 
doctrine was the "New Look," which emphasized economies of dollar cost 
and troop commitments in national defense in favor of relying on 
technological advantage to counter the perceived Soviet threat. In 
short order, civilian enthusiasts of technological advantage, newly 
arrived in the office of the Secretary of Defense, began to prevail 
upon the Air Force to step up its intercontinental ballistic missile 
program, the feasibility of which seemed all the higher as a result of 
the early hydrogen bomb tests, which suggested that a megaton of 
explosive could be delivered to the Soviet Union via a missile less 
powerful than had previously been assumed. 42 
W~ile at times the insistent economizing threatened to curtail 
defense R&D, the demands of hi-tech armament -- nuclear warheads, 
rockets and missiles, antisubmarine warfare and continental defense 
systems, and the like -- prevented federal, including military, 
research expenditures from falling after the war; indeed, in areas 
related to these major military systems, they kept rising at a moderate 
42 See, for example, York and Greb, "Military Research and 
Development" (1977), pp. 20-21; Armacost, The Politics of Weapons 
Innovation (1969), pp. 28-31, 56-58. Insightful observations upon the 
Air Force's reluctance to move rapidly into an ICBM program are 
advanced in Robert L. Perry, "Commentary," in Monte D. Wright and 
Lawrence J. Paszek, eds., Science, Technology, and Warfare (1969), pp. 
119-21. 
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rate. 43 Defense, and defense-related, agencies provided between 80% and 
90% of federal R&D monies. They made hi-tech industrial research 
increasingly a ward of the military, with defense projects supplying an 
ever-larger fraction -- the portion crossed the 50% mark in 1956 --of 
total expenditures for industrial research. DOD and the ABC together 
were pervasive presences on the nation's campuses, the source of 
funding for the vast majority of research in physics, electronics, 
aeronautics, computers, and myriad other branches of the physical 
sciences and engineering. 44 
The situation left academic scientists well supported and 
comfortable. The Korean War had put a hold on any serious move to 
transfer support for pure science out of the military and into the 
National Science Foundation. When the Eisenhower administration took 
office, it ventured such a transfer. The Office of Naval Research had 
already turned against any such idea. The attitudes of many university 
scientists were no doubt represented by Lee DuBridge, who took anus 
against the move, stressing to Arthur Flemming that the poor-relation 
43 A bete noir of the basic research community was Secretary of 
Defense Charles E. Wilson, who, having spent his career at General 
Motors, where there was no significant tradition of scientific 
research, tried to cut the defense R&D budget more than once during the 
Eisenhower administration and opined while at the Pentagon that "basic 
research is when you don't know what you are doing." See Killian to 
DuBridge, June 25, 1953, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 14; Kev1es, The 
Physicists (1987) p. 383; Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, 
(1969), pp. 32-33, 267. 
44 See Melvin Kranzberg, "Science, Technology, and Warfare: 
Action, Reaction, and Interaction in the Post-World War II Era," in 
Wright and J. Paszek, eds., Science, Technology, and Warfare (1969), p. 
162; Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), pp. 161-64,191-94, 
220-21; Kevles, The Physicists (1987), pp. 374-75. 
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NSF would have to be granted appropriations "ten times their present 
level" to do the job properly, an amount of money that Congress would 
surely decline to provide. The NSF, OuBridge added, was "wholly 
unsuitable for the support of large research projects at large research 
centers. The California Institute of Technology, for example, would go 
broke very promptly if all of its basic research support were suddenly 
transferred to the National Science Foundation."45 
DuBridge's viewpoint prevailed. The nation's scientific 
leadership breathed a collective sigh of relief when it became clear 
that very little basic research would be transferred to the NSF and 
that most such research would continue to be supported in the pluralist 
system that had grown up since 1945 under the military's generous and 
predominant patronage. Yet perhaps more important than the particular 
victory was what the process by which the victory had been achieved 
indicated -- that scientists like OUSridge were now exercising 
considerable influence at the levels of high policymaking in a way that 
they had not been, save perhaps in the nuclear-weapons area, under 
Truman. 
The establishment of the Science Advisory Committee had put 
scientists institutionally within reach of the White House; Eisenhower 
took them inside of it. The President was naturally skeptical about the 
claims of the military that he knew so well and eager for alternative 
45 William T. Golden, Memos to File, "Conversation with Mr. 
Charles Stauffacher re National Science Foundation • •• ," Dec. 6, 
1950; '~onversation with Rear Admiral T. Solberg, Director, Office of 
Naval Resarch," Jan. 15, 1951, Golden MSS; OuBridge to Flemming, August 
12, 1953, C!K MSS, Box 256, folder 15; authors's conversation with Lee 
OUBridge, July 15, 1988;. 
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yet informed sources of opinion on issues of technology and national 
security. The committee was kept apprised of relevant discussions in 
the National Security council by Robert Cutler and, eventually, by its 
own executive secretary, David Beckler, who sat in on NSC meetings. On 
its part, the committee was constantly active even outside of its 
regular meetings, with its members in New York, Cambridge, and Pasadena 
constituting themselves as local sections for discussion. 46 
At a combined meeting of the Cambridge ana New York groups, on 
March 10, 1954, considerable attention was given to the urgency of the 
problems posed by new weapons and the necessity of incorporating an 
understanding of those problems into military planning. The committee, 
much impressed by Project Hartwell, thought highly of analyses of 
weapons as they might be integrated into strategy. At the urging of 
Jerrold Zacharias, the group decided to seek a meeting with the 
President and the National Security Council to urge the creation of a 
special group to study the overall problem of science and national 
defense. 47 On March 27, 1954, the committee met with the Eisenhower, 
who focused attention on the problem of surprise attack and asked that 
46 Conversation with Lee DuBridge, July 15, 1988; I. I. Rabi, "The 
President and His Scientific Advisers," in Golden, ed., Science Advice 
to the President (1980), pp. 21-22; DuBridge to Members of the Science 
Advisory Committee, Feb. 15, 1954, C!K MSS, Box 257, folder 2. 
47 "Meeting of the Cambridge-New York Group of the Science 
Advisory Committee," March 10, 1954, attached to Killian to Beckler, 
March 17, 1954; Beckler to Killian, March 19, 1954 and attached "Scope 
of Proposed Examination of New Weapons and National Strategy," draft, 
March 19, 1954, CIK MSS, Box 257, folders 2, 18; enthusiasm for 
Hartwell-type projects was manifest at the meeting and also earlier in 
Oliver E. Buckley, "Notes on Report of the Committee on Plans for 
Mobilizing Science," draft, June 8, 1951, attached to Buckley to 
Killian, June 15, 1951, C!K MSS, Box 256, folder 9. 
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his science advisors conduct a study of the matter. The request led to 
the formation of the Technological Capabilities Panel under James R. 
Killian, which interpreted its charge broadly and set about 
investigating not only the gathering of intelligence to guard against 
surprise attack but also several other topics, including what 
technology might do for the retaliatory power of American deterrence. 48 
In February 1955, the panel delivered its report, stressing, in a tone 
of foreboding, that the united States was vulnerable to surprise attack 
and urging, among other things, that the country establish overflight 
surveillance of the Soviet Union and give highest priority to the 
development of both long-range and inter:mediate range ballistic 
missiles. The panel presented its recommendations in an extended 
discussion of the National Security Council -- a session that Robert 
Cutler recalled as the high point of deliberations during his tenure as 
the president's special assistant for national security.49 
It has often been said that the President's Science Advisory 
Committee provided a voice of restraint against unbridled acceleration 
of the arms race. At least one such note was heard in the PSAC's pre-
Sputnik incarnation. At the March 1954 of the Science Advisory 
Committee's New York-Cambridge contingent, the strongest push for a 
study to evaluate the broad bnplications of new weapons had come from 
48 James R. Killian, S utnik, Scientists and Eisenhower (1977), 
pp. 70-71; DuBridge to Flemmlng, July 21, 1954, C MSS, Box 257, 
folder 18 •• 
49 Armacost, The Politics of weapons Innovation (1969), pp. 50-
53; Killian, S utnlk, SClentlsts ana Elsenhower, (1977), pp. 71-86; 
Killian, "The Orlgln and Uses of SClentl lC Presence in the White 
House," in Golden, ed., Science Advice to the President (1980), p. 29. 
34 
1.1. Rabi. His reasons, passionately advanced: thermonuclear weapons 
could not be thought of as nuclear weapons might have been construed in 
the late 1940s, solely as military weapons. Their use would risk 
political and psychological upheaval, and their role in strategic 
policy had to be assessed with regard to such implications. In Rabi's 
view, disarmament negotiations were imperative. American democratic 
institutions could not survive an indefinite aDDS build-up.50 
Reaction in the gathering was mixed. Oliver Buckley, worried 
that Rabi's ideas might be taken as implied criticism of the New Look, 
proposed an alternative, and narrower, purpose for the study - "to 
examine strategic plans and pOlicies in light of new weapons," with 
reference above all to assessment and "public indoctrination of the 
urgency implicit in our present danger."51 It was, of course, 
Buckley's version that eventually formed the basis of the establishment 
of the Technological Capabilities Panel, whose recommendations helped 
obtain the highest national priority for the ICBM program and also 
precipitated what became the Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris programs. 52 In 
the pre-Sputnik era, what the Science Advisory Committee brought to 
national security-policyrnaking was another version of what the Korean 
50 York and Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar 
History" (1977), p. 13; "Meeting of the cambridge-New York Group of the 
Science Advisory Comnittee," March 10, 1954, attached to Killian to 
Beckler, March 17, 1954, C!K MSS, Box 257. 
51 Ibid. 
52 York and Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar 
History" (1977), pp. 21-22. This account, like Killian's, of the 
Panel's origins, misses the role of Rabi's concerns in the creation of 
the TCP and, thus, the irony in the outcome. See Killian, Sputnik, 
Scientists, and Eisenhower (1977), pp. 67-68. 
35 
War had fostered --not so much restraint as new or stengthened forms of 
institutionalized opportunities, and in some ways incentives, to 
ratchet up the arms race. 
36 
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